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Can Audit (still) be Trusted?  
 
 
Abstract  
This paper analyses audit as an exemplar of an expert system. The paper explores the premise 
that systemic trust in audit has been damaged and requires repair, looking specifically at the 
role of the institutionalised mechanism of the public inquiry. This is examined empirically in 
relation to the interaction between the Heads of the Big Four accounting firms in the UK and 
the House of Lords Economic Select Committee in the course of the recent parliamentary 
investigation into the UK Audit market, prompted by the global financial crisis. In particular, 
the paper seeks to understand how there can be transfer of trust, following Sztompka (1999), 
between different levels and between agents in a system. In this case, the Big Four - as 
privileged market participants - require re-legitimation from agents that are part of the 
political and legal apparatus. We therefore argue that re-legitimation of the Big Four’s 
privileged market position is dependent on transfer of trust.  
Key words: trust, accountability, audit, expert systems, Big Four, financial crisis, transfer of 
trust. 
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Can Audit (still) be trusted? 
 
“Audits of various sorts come to replace the trust that social government 
invested in professional wisdom and the decisions and actions of specialists.” 
(Miller & Rose, 2008: 110) 
 “Financial magicians went from being the objects of public envy to the targets 
of universal contempt. Politicians became exposed as corrupt and as liars. 
Governments were denounced. Media were suspected. Trust vanished. And 
trust is what glues together society, the market, the institutions. Without trust, 
nothing works. Without trust, the social contract dissolves and people 
disappear as they transform into defensive individuals fighting for survival”. 
(Castells, 2013: 1) 
 
Introduction 
Since 2008, governments, international agencies and the media have sought to 
understand the causes of the financial crisis and establish ‘who is to blame’ (Davies, 2010). 
Integral to this process has been an ebbing away of trust in a broad spectrum of actors across 
the global financial system (Gillespie et. al., 2012; Stiglitz, 2012; Rajan, 2010). This extended 
in due course to asking critical questions of the Big Four accounting firms that audited the 
accounts of the major financial institutions that failed. The mistrust pandemic that has 
engulfed the financial system taps into a broader erosion of trust in institutions found across 
contemporary society (Misztal, 1996: 3), especially during the last twenty years or so (Kouzes 
& Posner, 2011: Ch.1). The research question driving this paper is: how does the expert system 
of audit justify itself in the light of apparent failure and ensure that, institutionally, audit can 
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still be trusted? We address this question through an analysis of the interrogation and 
testimony of UK managing partners of the four major accounting firms – the ‘Big Four’ - in a 
2010 House of Lords inquiry into the British audit market. The central contribution of this 
study is to explore extant understandings of trust repair (Dietz & Gillespie, 2012; Bachmann 
& Inkpen, 2011; Sztompka, 1999; Kramer & Cook, 2004). Secondarily, the study draws on and 
contributes to the literature on expert systems and trust (Barrett et al, 2005; Barrett and 
Gendron, 2006; Fogarty et al, 2006; Free 2008; Jeacle & Carter, 2011) and audit failure 
(Humphrey et al., 2009; Arnold & Sikka, 2001; Power, 1997; Thornburg & Roberts, 2008) 
respectively. Our approach is a sociological one, which aims to contribute towards an 
empirically informed analysis of audit, trust and the role of the public inquiry.   
Outside of academic concerns on trust, this paper resonates, more generally, with the 
crisis of trust that many institutions currently face. The number of crises and scandals during 
say the last fifteen years has “assaulted our confidence in the trustworthiness of the 
organizational systems on which we rely.” (Kramer & Cook, 2004: 2; cf. Eilifsen & Willekens, 
2008: 2-3) The period in which the Lords inquiry took place is perhaps significant for 
understanding the dataset we draw upon. It followed “a deepening crisis of public trust” 
(O’Neill, 2002: 8), which in the context of the UK comprised of a scandal over parliamentary 
expenses, a melt-down in the banking sector, and a phone hacking scandal in the media (see 
Dietz & Gillespie, 2012). These scandals occurred in a context whereby the framing of news, 
for instance, by emphasizing negative actor traits, was overwhelmingly hostile and implicated 
the media in growing cynicism or distrust among the public (Cappella & Jamieson, 1997; 
Kramer, 2006: 9). An illustration of the ‘mistrust pandemic’ was the public debate at the 2013 
Edinburgh International Book Festival: chaired by Gavin Esler, a highly respected BBC 
journalist, a series of events took place under the header “The Collapse of Trust” with 
individual sessions focusing on “Can we trust the media?”, “Can we trust each other?”, “Can 
we trust the government?”, “Can we trust the economists?”  
Related concepts of trust, mistrust and the repair of trust go to the heart of the 
zeitgeist. In the aftermath of the Wikileaks affair, serious questions of data security and 
privacy, involving Google and other Internet firms, have fuelled major discussions around the 
extent to which citizens across the world are able to trust their political and corporate leaders. 
The ‘mistrust pandemic’ is internationalist in its orientation and serious questions of trust in 
contemporary markets, institutions and society have been debated widely, including in the 
U.S. (eg Cappella & Jamieson, 1997; Lounsbury & Hirsch, 2010; Kouzes & Posner, 2011; Bohnet 
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et al., 2012), Germany (Gehrig, 2013; Rosenberger & Seeber, 2013), as well as globally (eg 
Castells, 2013).  
In the U.K., wave upon wave of scandals, ranging from the autism scare, phone 
hacking, patient neglect in NHS hospitals, Westminster MPs’ expenses, encourages us to ask 
whether the traditionally respected professions still deserve or have in fact lost our trust.  This 
sensibility is reflected in publications asking whether we can trust the BBC (Aitken, 2008, 
2013), trust the media (Monck & Hanley, 2008), trust our leaders (Kouzes & Posner, 2011; 
Krastev, 2013), trust our fellow citizens, and whether “a revolution in accountability (can) 
remedy our ‘crisis of trust’?” (O’Neill, 2002: 4) In the wake of this general ‘crisis of trust’, as 
well as the 2008- financial crisis, the expert system of audit was thus at risk from its critics 
(Sikka, 2009). Therefore, we commend trust as a central concept to organization theory as it 
seeks to understand contemporary organizations. 
The current crisis in trust is focused not only on certain high profile individuals, but 
extends to organizations and institutions: firmaments of the establishment that have been 
undermined by scandal. While individuals – such as high profile bankers - might be 
scapegoated for their failings and blamed for the collapse of their organizations, the crisis in 
trust goes much further: it strikes at the heart of ‘expert systems’, which Barrett et al. (2005, 
p. 19), in their study of large accounting firms, note “facilitate standardization across contexts 
and provide a key coordinating function”. We argue that expert systems embody “abstract 
trust in the organizational regimes of coordination, supervision, or leadership that safeguard 
smooth cooperation” (Sztompka, 1999: 63). We seek to show how the trustworthiness of the 
Big Four accounting firms’ expert systems can be reaffirmed or (further) undermined at one 
critical juncture, namely the testimony at a Parliamentary Select Committee inquiry. For this 
purpose, we utilize Sztompka’s (1999: 46-51; 2000; 2003; 2007) sociological theory of the 
transfer of trust. Thus, in this paper we develop an existing sociological theory, but transport 
it into a new field, namely organization and management theory. The application of 
Sztompka’s work enables us to enhance our existing understanding of testimony and audit.  
 
Trust, Institutions and Expert Systems 
The serious loss of trust in major institutions, expert systems and organizations is anticipated 
and reflected in the extant organization theory literature on trust (Bachmann & Inkpen, 2011; 
Kouzes & Posner, 2011: Ch.1; Kramer & Cook, 2004; Misztal, 1996: 3; Kramer & Pittinsky, 
2012). Institution-based trust (Zucker, 1986) is distinct from more inter-personal and 
community-based forms of trust: “Institution-based trust means that one believes the 
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necessary impersonal structures are in place to enable one to act in anticipation of a successful 
future endeavour” (McKnight et al., 1998/2006: 119). Impersonal structures resonate closely 
with expert systems, such as auditing. It also extends to include legal regulations, professional 
codes of conduct, corporate reputation, employment contracts and others (Bachmann & 
Inkpen, 2011). In contrast to trust relying on personal interactions (Mayer et al, 1995; Hosmer, 
1995: 398), expert systems are premised on systems trust (Giddens, 1990; Luhmann, 1979), 
which rely on a ‘leap of faith’ that the expert systems will perform as we expect them to 
(Nandkumar, 1999: 47; Möllering, 2001: 404). Specifically, we cannot know for sure, or check 
comprehensively, that all the audits that get done, are performed competently and with 
integrity – hence we need to have faith that they will. Following Giddens (1990: 34-5) and 
Sztompka (1999: 29-40), the converse of trust is risk: the potentiality of unexpected and 
adverse outcomes. If audit, as an expert system, is judged as too risky in its present format, 
then ‘too much trust’ is required to keep it going: “trust transforms uncertainty into risk … 
Where there is no risk, trust cannot exist, nor is it needed.” (Bachmann, 2006: 395)  
It is possible to distinguish four bases of trust: “One can trust individuals, 
organisations, institutions and systems.” (Noteboom, 2012: 9) Lane (1998: 14-19) 
distinguishes between micro-level, institutional, system and societal trust. Similarly, Banerjee 
et al. (2006: 305-6) identify three levels, but with cross-combinations, and this results in nine 
types of trust relationships, as trust may take place between entities at the same level 
(individual, organizational, societal), or between entities at different levels. Hence, they 
introduce the concept of the ‘pyramid of trust’ that spans different levels: I may trust a pianist 
because I know that she graduated from an esteemed piano school, was favourably reviewed 
in a newspaper, which I value highly, and the recordings are produced by a music company 
which I trust (and so on). The notion of trust transfer is related to this ‘pyramid of trust’ 
(Sztompka, 1999: 47). It is noteworthy that audit functions at all levels: from the inter-personal 
interactions between a client and auditor (Anderson-Gough et al., 2000), to the societal- or 
institutional-level trust that society places in auditors (Power, 1997) to ensure, for instance, 
the effective functioning of stock market trading. Whilst we can trust organizations, 
organizations themselves cannot trust “because it is individuals as members of organizations, 
rather than the organizations themselves, who trust.” (Zaheer et al., 1998: 141) Sztompka 
(1999: 46) concurs, arguing that “we ultimately trust human actions” – for example, if we trust 
the members of a parliamentary committee to be both competent, impartial and act with 
integrity, then we are more likely to trust the functioning of the system that the Committee 
was charged with investigating. In this sense, trust ’travels’ or can be transferred. When trust 
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has broken down, ethical doubts may find their expression in critical questioning, directed at 
so-called ‘bridge concepts’, or problematic concepts, such as ‘conflict of interests’ or ‘fairness’ 
(Banerjee et al., 2006: 304). Thus, clients may critically interrogate professionals, or members 
of Committees may critically interrogate partners, who appear at the testimony to defend 
both the organization but also the profession.  
Finally, organizational level trust in the competence and integrity, but not necessarily 
benevolence, of the Big Four is a necessary precondition for us to provide a restrictive 
oligopoly to a few select market operators. We conceive of audit as both an institution and an 
expert system: for the purposes of this paper, we will not distinguish therefore between 
system and institutional trust (Bachmann, 2006: 398) – indeed, we follow Barber (1983: 18) 
who argued that abstract systems are rooted in societal (legal, political, educational) 
institutions and, therefore trusting a system means trusting the corresponding institution(s).  
 
Trust in the Audit System before and since the Global Financial Crisis 
Audit is designed to ensure trust by providing “professionally structured and 
independent information to a variety of actors in the accountability process.” (White & 
Hollingsworth, 1999: 9) In the UK, “(w)hen the accounting process has been completed, an 
external audit evaluates and reports on the accuracy of the account. This is the second stage, 
and a separate stage, in the process to hold to account those responsible for the management 
of an organization’s finance.” (ibid. p.25) Building on this definition, we conceive of the expert 
system deployed by the Big Four firms as stretching across time, through the provision of 
judgements on the past (audit) and future (capital investment plans, tax planning, consulting), 
and stretching across space: both through the use of ‘immutable mobiles’ (e.g. numbers) 
(Briers & Chua, 2001), to translate dispersed organizational activities (e.g. multiple client 
locations) into a single entity (i.e. the audit report), and through the globalised presence of 
the Big Four across the world. However, we argue that during crucial performances at field-
configuring events (McInerney, 2008), such as public inquiries, person-based interactions can 
be decisive for de-stabilizing or re-stabilizing institutionalised (systems of) trust.  
The 2010 British House of Lords inquiry into the Big Four Audit Firms is but one such 
instance. The inquiry looked into the Big Four’s role in the Global Financial Crisis and assessed 
whether audit firms could be trusted with regard to their competence and their integrity – 
because audit quality typically refers to the ability of the auditor to detect misstatements and 
willingness to include this in the audit report (Eilifsen & Willekens, 2008: 3), in spite of the fact 
that the client is also their paymaster. One issue at stake was the question over whether 
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insufficient regulation played a major part in bringing about the financial crisis (Gamble, 2009: 
7; Crouch, 2011: 163; Engelen et al., 2012). For neo-liberal free markets to work, the markets 
need to be able to trust the information produced by market participants (Casey, 2011; 
Stiglitz, 2010), such as the financial statements of companies (as ratified by auditors) and the 
ratings of debt (as ratified by credit rating agencies) (Rona-Tas & Hiss, 2010; Crotty, 2009; 
Goodhart, 2008; Campbell, 2010: 385; Holm & Zaman, 2012). A systemic financial crash 
intensifies scrutiny of such information-ratifying organizations. Auditors, some suggested, 
failed in their very duty to remain independent, place public interest above commercial 
interests and undertake their duties competently, objectively and prudently (Sikka, 2009).   
The collapse in trust in many of the key actors of the international financial system 
resonates with a long standing scepticism within the accounting literature towards the 
conduct of the Big Four (Mitchell et al, 1998; McMillan, 2004; Fogarty et al., 2009), especially 
in the light of previous corporate failures – from Arthur Andersen, DeLorean Motor Cars, BCCI, 
Enron, Parmalat, to WorldCom (e.g. Aruñada, 2004). Germany experienced their own set of 
perceived audit failures, which affected the companies Balsam, Schneider, Holzmann, 
Flowtex, and Comroad, but, overall, “(t)he effect on trust in the audit profession and hence 
the audit itself ... is hard to determine.” (Köhler et al., 2008: 112, 136-7) While the recent 
banking crisis is on a vastly greater scale than previous crises and corporate failures, it reprises 
longstanding concerns about auditor independence, audit quality and conflicts of interest 
(Sikka, 2008; 2009).  It is worth recalling that a decade ago Arthur Andersen’s association with 
the collapse of Enron was to undermine trust not only in Arthur Andersen, but in the expert 
systems employed by the Big Five (as they were then known) and the institution of audit more 
generally (Unerman & O’Dwyer, 2004). The legislative corollary of the Enron crisis was the 
passing of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which marked the biggest statutory intervention in the US 
capital markets and accounting profession since the 1930s (Fogarty et al, 2006); this illustrates 
that where institutionalised trust breaks down, new forms of regulation and state intervention 
may well have to follow (Bachmann, 2001/6: 462-3; Gillespie et. al., 2012). As such, “audit 
quality is not just a mere technical phenomenon, but is also part of the rhetoric employed by 
regulators, professional bodies and audit firms in the aftermath of corporate failures and 
resulting lack of trust in auditing.” (Holm & Zaman, 2012: 59) Thus, in the run-up to the Select 
Committee meetings there has clearly been a discursive contest surrounding audit, audit 
quality and the audit firms. Indeed, even before any testimony was given, the Select 
Committee was, reportedly, “unimpressed by the profession’s current performance.” 
(Chambers, 2011: 5)  
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Power (1997: 125) argues that assertions as to what audit is not (say insurance or 
certification) have “contributed to a loss of confidence in what is really being said by financial 
auditors.” Indeed, it is noteworthy that accounting irregularities are rarely uncovered by 
auditors, more often than not they are revealed by financial journalists or whistle-blowers. 
Yet, when irregularities are uncovered, it is almost always the auditors that find themselves in 
the spotlight. Shore and Wright (2000: 77) argued that “(a)udit encourages the displacement 
of a system based on autonomy and trust by one based on visibility and coercive 
accountability.” Shapiro (1987: 635) analysed auditors as an example of the 
institutionalization of distrust: auditors can be viewed as agents who control other agents, i.e. 
the management board, on behalf of principals (owners, shareholders). Both Power and 
Shapiro identify an ‘inflationary spiral’ (Shapiro, 1987: 652) where those appointed by us, 
because we distrust, in turn require our trust. It is systematic distrust in the accuracy of 
financial records produced by a company that leads to the perceived need for auditors, who 
in turn rely on our trust that their inspection of the company is accurate, reliable, objective, 
and conducted with integrity. Thus, “(t)he new accountability culture aims at ever more 
perfect administrative control of institutional and professional life.” (O’Neill, 2002: 46) 
If, for Power (1994: 13; 1997: 123) and Sztompka (1999: 146), audit is a form of latent 
distrust and yet for its normal operation it is predicated on trust, we similarly suggest that 
forms of political governance following a breakdown in trust – such as the parliamentary 
inquiry we analyse - might remove our temporary distrust but only insofar as we trust in the 
effectiveness and integrity of the political system of inquiry, scrutiny, representation and 
reform itself.  
A professional license to practice is, as with diplomas, accreditations, academic titles, 
and other such symbols of trust, an example of an “encapsulated credential” which allows us 
to “consider the target trustworthy without considering any other cues.” (Sztompka, 1999: 
73) However, we know little about what happens when these symbols of trust are no longer 
fully functional. As Bachmann (2001/6: 463) points out, “it could be argued that the absence 
of strong forms of system trust at least results in greater awareness of the development of 
personal trust”. Building on Bachman’s point, we argue that at crucial junctures or ‘field 
configuring events’ (McInerney, 2008), trust is built up at interactional level: “’Interactional 
trust’ rests on social actors’ reliability, integrity and communicative skills and does in principle 
not need powerful institutional arrangements to be developed effectively.” (Bachmann, 2006: 
398) Indeed, in our case we aim to show that the political inquiry is an institutionalised and 
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ritualised process of trust problematisation and (potentially) restoration based on 
interactional performances. 
A central focus for our theoretical contribution is Sztompka’s (1999: 46-51) theory of 
transfer of (dis)trust: for example, widespread distrust in certain politicians may spread to the 
offices they occupy, it may extend  to the government and eventually perhaps to the political 
regime as a whole – a spiral of distrust that we discussed earlier. Similarly, ‘agencies of 
accountability’ (ibid., p.47) including the parliamentary committee we examine, are potential 
pillars for the objects of our primary trust, in this case audit. There can be a positive cycle of 
transfer of trust (where political representatives sanction an institution as trustworthy); there 
can also be a negative cycle of transfer of distrust (where political representatives sanction an 
institution as untrustworthy and create further regulation and intervention aimed at restoring 
trust). In summary, we suggest viewing inquiries as institutionalised rituals (Meyer & Rowan, 
1983; Brown, 2000) that attempt to scrutinise, interrogate, and ultimately repair trust by, in 
our case, providing renewed legitimacy to the institution of audit. This is the precise point 
where we adapt and develop existing sociological theory: we argue that inquiries are rituals 
pertaining to government and regulation, and consequently they constitute a very different 
type of repair mechanism compared to organization-level or corporate trust repair episodes 
covered in the extant trust literature (Dietz & Gillespie, 2012).  
 
Audit, Markets and Socio-Political Settlements 
Why, then, are the State and associated regulatory bodies important for trust in the audit 
system?  One of the central contributions of economic sociology lies in its explication of the 
socio-political embedding of markets (Polanyi, 1944/2001; Swedberg, 1997; Blyth, 2002; 
Mackenzie, 2009; Lounsbury & Hirsch, 2010). These insights allow us to understand how the 
audit market has been created by particular national political settlements: by this we mean 
that certain firms are permitted to operate within an oligopolistic market structure in 
exchange for their assurances of ‘professional’ conduct. This settlement means that 
professional service firms are entrusted with certain market privileges, such as restrictions on 
competition or absence of mandatory tendering, insofar as they are trusted not to abuse these 
privileges for self-interested commercial gain (Reed, 1996). Audit and the audit market are 
reliant on a socio-political warrant and jurisdiction, including privileges being granted to 
professions at national level (Humphrey et al. 2009). While the neo-liberal project, which is of 
a global nature (Harvey, 2006), proclaims that market relations can and should be freed, i.e. 
separated, from social and political relations (Friedman, 1962), in moments of crisis the socio-
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political sub-structure becomes the very resource of trust-restoration (Polanyi, 1944/2001). 
The question for us in this paper is: to what extent can the political system restore our trust 
in the institutionalised system of audit? If it can do this, how does this take place?  
Following Bachmann and Inkpen’s (2011) argument, we argue that an unconvincing 
testimonial performance at the committee could undermine confidence and trust in the 
institution of audit (i.e. systems trust), as well as the Big Four (i.e. organizational trust); 
conversely, the ritualised display of a tough interrogation followed by convincing responses 
could result in a transfer of trust from a trusted institution, such as a parliamentary 
committee, to the Big Four. ‘Transference’ of trust means that the trustor draws on proof 
sources from which trust is transferred to a target (Doney et al., 1998: 606). Specific ‘ritual’ 
performances-as-interactions are thus crucially linked to the repair of potentially damaged 
trust at organizational and institutional (system) level. As Sztompka (1999: 46) argued, “(w)e 
ultimately trust human actions, and derivatively their effects, or products. Thus, in the case of 
systemic trust, we expect beneficial actions of … the agents of various institutions and 
organizations, making up the fabric of our society.” Sztompka’s (2007) analysis of trust in 
‘science’ is particularly relevant here, given the parallels with notions of ‘professionalism’: 
‘What we ultimately trust is the performance of these roles: competent, fair and honest, 
rational and critical, disinterested and innovative. Thus ultimately, in all these cases, ‘trust in 
science’ may be reduced to the trust in the actions of scholars, researchers, organizers of 
science, together making up the scientific community.’ (ibid. p.213) We will now turn to an 
overview of the context of our study. 
  
Background and Context 
Our study analyses the testimony of the Big Four in the UK as part of the House of 
Lords Economic Committee’s investigation of the UK Audit market. The British Parliamentary 
System is bicameral, comprising of the House of Commons and the House of Lords. The former 
is an elected chamber, the latter is appointed with a small proportion of hereditary Lords also 
being members. Each house has a number of Select Committees that scrutinise important 
issues of the day (Ryle, 1997). The Select Committee System was introduced in 1979 following 
a ‘fierce debate’ (Hindmoor et al, 2009: 86) concerning the primacy of parliament: those 
advocating the Select Committee system argued that it was an important means of 
scrutinising government; the critics felt it was shifting discussion away from the parliamentary 
debating chamber and thus undermining parliament. As a result of the 1979 reforms, the 
‘power and scope of Committee inquiries were considerably strengthened and extended, 
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especially with regard to the provision of information, the attendance of witnesses and the 
production of records and papers’ (Nixon, 1986: 416).  
The House of Lords committees are, in contrast to those in the Commons, organized 
on broad ‘topical lines’ rather than scrutinising individual government departments; the 
corollary is that their inquiries are generally more broad-ranging than those in the House of 
Commons: “Lords Select Committees do not shadow the work of government departments. 
Their investigations look into specialist subjects, taking advantage of the Lords’ expertise and 
greater amount of time (compared to MPs) available to them to examine issues”.1 The 
Economic Affairs Select Committee comprises of Lords with considerable financial expertise, 
with the Committee being composed of members drawn from the elite of the financial 
establishment who have a detailed understanding of economic affairs. Members have 
included former Treasury Ministers (Chancellor of the Exchequer, Chief Secretary to the 
Treasury), former Government Ministers, a former Deputy Chairman of JP Morgan, a Deputy 
Chair of the Competition Commission, and a senior financier and a well-known financial 
journalist.  
Committees are commissioned to write reports into specific issues: ‘They receive 
written submissions from interested groups or individuals, compel them if necessary to attend 
oral evidence hearings where committee members can interrogate them, and require relevant 
documents to be made available’ (Hindmoor et al, 2009:  71) The oral evidence hearings are 
televised and these recordings (and transcriptions) are readily available to the public. Hearings 
on some issues are high profile affairs and conducted in an adversarial manner; the cross-
examination of Rupert Murdoch and his son, James, in July 2011, during the phone hacking 
inquiry is a good example of this process.  
Select Committees attempt, wherever possible, to produce reports unanimously 
agreed by members of the Select Committee, avoiding split reports along partisan lines.  
Government is obliged to respond to the report within three months of receipt; it is not, 
however, under any requirement to accept or evaluate the recommendations (Hindmoor et 
al, 2009: 72). While Select Committees have limited powers - they are unable to initiate, 
amend or reject legislation, nor can they insist that an issue is debated in parliament – they 
are held to serve an important function in Parliament (Hansard, 2001; Rodgers and Walters, 
2006). Certainly, some former Government Ministers note (Mullin, 2009) that they seemed to 
exercise far more influence as a Chair of a Select Committee than as a junior minister. In an 
interview we conducted with a former MP, who had chaired a Commons Select Committee, 
                                                          
1 Source: http://www.parliament.uk/about/how/committees/select/ 
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the interviewee stated that his committee work gave him ‘a fair bit of influence, certainly 
more than when a minister’2. The Lords Committees, according to our interviewee, were 
highly regarded because of their expertise and had more time to investigate issues.  
 The difficulty of assessing the concrete impact of Select Committees on policy is 
compounded by the fact that very few of the reports produced by the bodies are actively 
debated in Parliament, even less result in legislative changes. In spite of this, the widely 
accepted view is that Select Committees play a ‘valuable function within the political system’ 
(Hindmoor et al, 2009: 86), suggesting that influence within Parliament works perhaps more 
in way of ‘agenda setting’. It is almost certainly the case that this agenda-setting, 
consciousness-raising role is where Select Committees record their biggest impact – the 
Culture and Media Select Committee’s inquiry in 2011 and the subsequent Leveson Inquiry 
being a good example.  
In outlining the rationale for the audit inquiry during a press conference, Lord 
McGregor explained the ‘problem’ with the audit market (‘dominated by a very small number 
of players’) and also framed the nature of the proposed ‘solution’ (‘promoting more 
competition’). The Big Four audit firms, he claimed, failed to pick up on ‘unsustainable risks’ 
being taken by the financial sector. The aim of the report emanating from the inquiry, he 
concludes, is to provide ‘better services to business and investors’. The committee invited 
evidence to be submitted to the committee by the 27th of September 2010 that related to the 
following questions:  
 
 “How has auditing come to be dominated by four global firms? Should more 
competition be introduced? And if so how? 
 Does a lack of competition lead to excessive fees being charged? 
 Were auditors sufficiently sceptical when auditing banks in the run up to the 
financial crisis in 2008? Could they have done anything to mitigate the crisis? 
Can auditors now contribute to better regulation of banks? 
 Do conflicts of interest arise between audit and consultancy roles? How can 
these be avoided or mitigated?  
 Should the role of internal auditors be enhanced and how should they 
interact with external auditors?”3 
                                                          
2 Interview, August 21st, 2013, Edinburgh, Scotland. 
3 Twenty-one written submissions were also made to the inquiry, ranging from letters from private citizens, academics, Baker 
Tilly accounting firm, the California Public Employees Retirement System, International Audit and Assurance Standards Board, UK 
Shareholders Association and Corporate Value Associates. In total the Economics committee asked 553 questions, which were 
transcribed and made available on the House of Lords website. The sessions were also broadcast live on Parliament TV. On the 
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While our paper focuses exclusively on the hearing conducted on the 23rd November 
2010, our knowledge of the other hearings and written submissions also informed our analysis 
and certain extracts from these other hearings will be cited selectively. The questioners and 
witnesses involved in the hearing we analyse are listed in Table 1. Prior to this meeting, a 
number of strong critiques of the Big Four had been made by other witnesses. While these 
are not the focus of our analysis here, this evidence is also available for interested readers4.  
 
---- Insert Table 1 around here ---- 
    
Given the tight focus of our paper on a specific hearing, it needs to be acknowledged 
that our paper is limited in its knowledge claims, similar to other interpretive work. In Brown’s 
(2000: 50) well-chosen words, “this paper is an artful product designed not just to inform but 
to persuade …” – indeed, and this means that we cannot engage in debates over how 
representative the chosen day of testimony or extracts are. Our knowledge claim is based on 
theoretical and internal validity not generalizability.    
 
Research analytics 
Our analysis is underpinned by the principle that legitimising accounts play a crucial role in 
the micro-institutional work that underpins the continued legitimacy (or otherwise) of a field, 
which underpins the trust that social actors place in institutions (Vaara & Monin, 2010; Holm 
& Zaman, 2012). For example, an appeal to professional values, such as truth or integrity, can 
serve to establish trust that a particular actor or organization will serve the interests of a client 
or wider society above more narrow self-interests (Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005). Similarly, 
accounts can also serve to de-legitimise and de-institutionalise previously accepted practices 
by undermining the trust that we place in them (Vaara & Tienari, 2008; Maguire & Phillips, 
2008; Maguire & Hardy, 2009; Hardy et al. 1998). More specifically, we draw on McInerney’s 
(2008) approach to studying the role of accounts in problematizing, or justifying, the 
arrangements prevailing in an established institutional field. Our approach can best be 
described as abductive:  we build on existing theory (deduction), but at the same time we are 
                                                          
30th of March the Economics Affairs Committee published their report.   See: 
http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/lords-select/economic-affairs-committee/inquiries/auditors-
market-concentration-and-their-role/ 
 
4 http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/lords-select/economic-affairs-
committee/inquiries/auditors-market-concentration-and-their-role/ 
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strongly guided by the data (induction). Thus, during the period of data analysis and writing a 
first draft, there is a “constantly going ‘back and forth’ from one type of research activity to 
another and between empirical observations and theory” (Dubois & Gadde, 2002: 555).  
The analysis was conducted as follows. Each of the three authors independently read 
the publicly available transcript of the testimony given by the senior UK partners of the Big 
Four on the 23rd November 2010, noting in particular the way in which trust in the expert 
system of audit was problematized or repaired by the questioners (Lords) and respondents 
(Big Four). In addition to this, as part of the revision of this paper an interview was conducted 
with a former MP, who had served as a Chair of a Select Committee.   
 
Trust Problematisation 
Deductively speaking, i.e. in light of what the literature says, given the multi-faceted nature 
of trust (Mayer et al., 1995/2006: Table 1), it is important to distinguish between the trustor’s 
belief in the respective competence, benevolence and integrity of another party (Gillespie et. 
al., 2012; Mayer, et. al., 1995/2006). Inductively speaking, our analysis shows that trust was 
problematized by the Committee members along two dimensions, namely integrity and 
competence. Thus, in way of performing abduction, we propose that benevolence did not 
form part of the trust problematisation process, indicating that auditors need to be perceived 
as competent and not (excessively) self-interested or dishonest, but not necessarily ‘kind-
hearted’ or ‘charitable’, in order to be trusted (Neu, 1991: 296).   
 
Integrity 
Relationships of exchange place the trustee in a position of vulnerability, where the potential 
for self-interested exploitation is possible (Frowe, 2005: 43). Integrity relates to perceptions 
that a party (individual or collective) will not exploit the other party in pursuit of self-interest. 
Two integrity issues were problematized by the Lords in their questioning of the Big Four, 
namely competition and conflicts of interest. The Big Four were firstly charged with anti-
competitive, protectionist behaviour designed to maintain or extend their oligopolistic 
position: “nearly almost all the audits in the FTSE 100 are now carried out by the Big Four and 
most of them in the FTSE 250.” (Chairman of Select Committee on Economic Affairs, Lord 
MacGregor) This questioner also raised the issue about the potential impact of one firm 
withdrawing, “since you are only four, any threat to withdraw could be said to be an abuse of 
a statutorily privileged position?” Indeed, if “the switching rates for a FTSE 100 company are 
every 48 years; for a FTSE 250, every 36 years and for all listed companies, every 25 years. 
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How can you possibly argue with a 4% churn every year that that’s a competitive market?” 
(Lord Forsyth)  
Secondly, the Big Four were also questioned about potential conflicts of interest 
relating to consultancy and advice services to clients they also audited: “Is there not a conflict 
of interest though at the heart of this because you’re providing advisory services, let us say, 
on taxation and tax planning, which is a major part of the professional services you supply, 
and then another group from your firm come along and audit the same thing?” (Lord Hollick) 
The charge here was that the Big Four exploited their position of power as an oligopoly and 
placed their self-interest in profit above their duty to investors and the wider public – thus 
undermining the trust that society places in auditors to produce fair, accurate and honest 
assessments of the financial state of audited companies.  
 
---- Insert Table 2 around here ---- 
    
Table 2 summarizes the four main points raised by the questioners, which 
problematized the trustworthiness of the Big Four with regard to integrity. We focus on these 
points because they potentially serve to undermine the credibility of the Big Four’s accounts 
and, thereby, pose questions around the trust in the expert system of audit. A detailed analysis 
of ‘trust problematization’ strategies with regard to competence is outlined in the next 
section.  
 
Competence 
Competence relates to perceptions that a party (individual or collective) has the required 
skills, knowledge and experience to deliver on a promise or fulfil a task (Barber, 1983: 14). 
Thus, a trustor could have high levels of trust in the integrity and benevolence of the trustee, 
but because of their belief that the trustee cannot competently execute their side of the 
bargain, would not enter into a relationship. For example, the trust required to feel confident 
about air travel relies not only on trusting the integrity (and much less benevolence) of the 
pilots, air traffic controllers and aeroplane manufacturer and maintenance crew, but most 
importantly on trusting their competence derived from qualifications, training and experience 
(Gillespie et. al., 2012; Frowe, 2005: 35-37; Sztompka, 1999: 52).  
Competence-based trust was problematized by the Lords in their interrogation of the 
Big Four with regard to two issues, namely practices of information exchange/representation 
and auditing standards. The Big Four were charged with failing to communicate important 
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information with investors and failing to have proper dialogue with regulators, in particular 
around risky financial products they audited in the banks. Specifically, Lord Lawson questioned 
why the auditors “didn’t say anything to the regulators at that time”, when concerns about 
risk and leverage within banks were first coming to light. Questions were also raised about 
alleged failings to maintain proper prudence in their audit judgements of the banks in 
particular: “do you think IFRS accounting standards led bank auditors to a tick-box approach 
instead of scepticism and prudent judgement on client banks as going concerns?” (Lord 
Forsyth) 
 
---- Insert Table 3 around here ---- 
    
Table 3 summarizes the allegations with regard to five problematic practices raised by 
the questioners, which problematized the trustworthiness of the Big Four with regard to their 
espoused competence.  
Thus, in summary, the problematisations voiced by the Lords serve to combine the 
two core elements of competence and integrity: either the auditors failed to uncover or 
understand the financial risks being taken by the banks (e.g. high leverage, risky trading 
practices, poorly risk tested financial models) – a failure of competence; or the auditors did 
see the financial risks being taken by the banks and deliberately chose not to inform investors 
or regulators to protect their commercial interest in maintaining their client relationship – a 
failure of integrity. A detailed analysis of trust repair strategies is outlined in the next section.  
 
 
Trust Repair 
The representatives of the Big Four used a variety of trust repair strategies. In terms of 
questions of integrity, our analysis has identified three main strategies used to attempt to 
repair trust - cosmological, higher values and legal compliance – which we will address in turn. 
First, the Big Four claim that the state of market concentration and low switching rates are 
the result of two natural forces and universal ‘cosmological’ laws: market forces and the forces 
of globalisation. Cosmological statements present the current state of affairs as the result of 
natural forces and universal laws (Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005). Representatives of the Big 
Four claimed that “the degree of concentration in the audit market has arisen as a direct result 
of market forces” (John Connolly, Deloitte), that it “...is the natural order of events in our 
industry” (John Griffith-Jones, KPMG) and “...the result of market choice” (Ian Powell, PwC), 
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also taking into account ““the natural tendencies to globalisation...” (John Griffith-Jones, 
KPMG).  By so doing, the Big Four attempt to restore trust by assuring the Committee, and the 
wider political system and general public, that the oligopoly is a result of client choice and 
their superior service, as opposed to self-interested protectionist behaviour aimed at 
restricting competition. Second, they (not surprisingly) appeal to higher values to present 
themselves as ‘above the fray’, as ‘above’ narrow self-interest, because of their professional 
commitment to ‘audit quality’: “So to be able to service clients that are very complex, that 
cover so many different territories, with real quality—and that is the ultimate focus of 
everything that we do, the quality of the audit...” (Ian Powell, PwC). This appeal to higher 
values – such as truth, knowledge, justice, society, public good, and so on – is a common 
feature of the discourse of professions (Freidson, 2001). Third and finally, the Big Four 
dismissed the notion that a conflict of interest does indeed exist between their auditing and 
consultancy services (such as tax planning advice) by stating that they ensure compliance with 
existing regulations: “… there are explicit rules already in existence that fundamentally say 
that you cannot audit your own work and there’s then a whole range of very specific 
exclusions … as a matter of fact, … in the last 12 months, no FTSE 100 company paid anything 
to their auditors for management consulting services.” (Mr John Connolly, Deloitte) Thus, 
existing regulation is presented as sufficient to ensure that the audit industry can be trusted, 
without the need for additional intervention or regulation. 
 
---- Insert Table 4 around here ---- 
  
 
A more complex array of trust repair strategies was used to respond to the 
problematization of their competence. In addition to appeals to cosmological forces and 
higher values, the Big Four also made reference to institutionalised conventions and 
jurisdiction, and they utilized pledges and concessions. First, cosmological statements were 
employed to justify the use of arguably more ‘light touch’ or ‘tick box’ IFRS standards, which 
replaced the more prudent and sceptical UK GAAP standards. The change was attributed to 
changes in the business environment, such as the introduction of new financial products like 
derivatives. This presents the IFRS standards as a natural and perhaps inevitable evolution 
rather than, say, a self-interested or complicit move to ‘lighter touch’ audit standards. Second, 
higher values of ‘protecting the public interest’ were used to justify their (lack of) 
communication with shareholders. The Big Four justified their actions on the basis of needing 
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to avoid giving market advantage to a select group of shareholders, thereby undermining their 
duty to act fairly and not privilege certain investors, along with practical considerations of how 
to secure meetings with inactive shareholders (see Fogarty et al., 2009). Thus, while a lack of 
communication and information exchange is recognised by the Big Four, this is not seen to 
represent a fundamental breakdown in trust because it is a result of external factors outside 
their control, not a deliberate strategy of avoidance or dereliction of duty. 
Third, lack of regular communication and information exchange with shareholders 
and regulators was attributed to institutionalised conventions – the way things have always 
been done. This accounted for their actions in ways that mitigates the implications that such 
practices were a sign of incompetence (i.e. they failed to notice financial irregularities or high-
risk investments) or lack of integrity (i.e. they did notice but sought to place commercial self-
interests above public interest). Fourth, the problematisation of trust in their auditing of the 
banks in particular was handled through appeals to professional jurisdiction: what the job of 
the auditor is, versus what is outside their scope, such as assessing the viability and risk of the 
business model used by a firm. Fifth and finally, concessions and pledges were used to show 
that (a) they accept that some kind of transgression in trust had taken place, (b) accept some 
(albeit limited) responsibility for their part therein, and (c) offer some attempt to heal the 
relationship through promises regarding future conduct: three important features of verbal 
accounts designed to repair trust (Lewicki & Polin, 2012). For example, Scott Halliday from 
Ernst & Young conceded that more needed to be done to improve dialogue, and pledged to 
improve practices in future: “If you look at the banking crisis, all four of us had meetings with 
the Bank of England around trying to improve the dialogue between the Bank of England and 
the firms. I think there’s more that can be done in that area including … more of a dialogue 
going both ways with auditor and the regulators.” Concessions were also made that the 
standards of audit had slipped and traditional prudence of judgement had been lost, and 
pledges to improve communication and information exchange with regulators and 
shareholders were made.  
 
---- Insert Table 5 around here ---- 
 
In summary, the representatives of the Big Four used a variety of trust repair 
strategies. They are illustrated by typical quotes in preceding Tables 4 and 5. We shall now 
discuss the ‘official report’ and efforts undertaken towards structural reform. 
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The Official Report and Structural Reform 
Our analysis above focuses on the problematization of trust by the Lords in their 
interrogation of the Big Four. Testimonies given to the other hearings within the Inquiry - 
regulators, professional bodies, academics - yielded considerable disagreement about 
whether trust had, in fact, broken down due to a failure in integrity and competence. Some 
witnesses – notably the academic witnesses – provided a critical analysis of regulations 
(“What we lost in that process of moving to IFRS for UK-listed companies was the true and fair 
view, the prudence principle and the principle of substance over form”, Prof Beattie) and 
market structure (“it is not a market at all, in the sense that there are not willing buyers in 
which one ordinarily thinks of markets. There are enforced buyers by statute …”, Prof Power) 
which displaced a focus on individual firms in favour of broader regulatory issues. Others, the 
professional bodies for instance, vehemently denied that any breach or breakdown in trust 
(especially with regard to the competence dimension) had occurred: “we believe that audit 
itself is fit for purpose in terms of the review of financial statements”, (Tilley, CIMA); “there is 
plenty of evidence that we can bring forward to say that the audit market delivering good 
outcomes happens but that is not grounds for being complacent” (Hodgkinson, ICAEW). 
Representatives from smaller consultancy firms similarly defended the status quo: “So what 
we have now is a system that works quite well. It suits the audit firms, it suits the management 
and it usually gets the right answer…” (Hayward, ‘Independent Audit’). In contrast, 
representatives of the medium-sized audit firms (Mazars, Grant Thornton, BDO, and RSM 
Tenon) warned that “in the event that one of the Big Four were to exit the market, there is a 
risk of systemic failure in the market” (Michaels, BDO). Because 70 % of FTSE 100 companies 
have not had an audit tender for 15 years, “it is currently a very stagnant market ... no matter 
which capability you have, you just don’t have the opportunity of showcasing it” (Herbinet, 
Mazars). Similarly, the Chairman of the Office of Fair Trading acknowledged that 
“...competition in the market for audit services to large companies may be limited, as a result 
of barriers to entry and expansion, switching costs and limiting choice in firms” (Collins). 
During the session for the Representatives of FTSE 250 firms, it was pointed out that “...the 
apparent falling away of the dialogue between the audit firms and the regulator” (Roberts, 
Finance Director, British Land) has been a negative development. By drawing on a fairly 
comprehensive range of witnesses with varying claims to credibility, whether based on 
academic expertise, practical experience or senior position, the inquiry aimed to strengthen 
the authority of the process that would lead to the final report; and thus, by implication, 
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increase the likelihood that the text, i.e. the final report, will “be received as authoritative.” 
(Brown, 2004: 96) What counts is not what the various parties claim in their accounts, but 
rather what version gets constructed in the final official report produced by the Lords, and 
indeed what changes followed this report. Following Brown (2004: 96), “inquiry reports are 
particularly interesting attempts to present a univocal and coherent view on what are 
generally readily acknowledged in the reports themselves to be complex and uncertain 
events.” Whilst the process of construction is necessarily contested, multi-vocal and 
fragmented, the outcome is presented as univocal, broadly uncontested and cogent. A 
singular voice of one author, even where a plurality of authors were in fact at work, is a 
necessary fiction for inquiry reports.  
The official report concluded that auditing is an oligopoly, thus it lacks adequate 
competition and protection against the self-interested behaviour of the Big Four; 
furthermore, the Big Four failed in their duty to protect the interests of the investment 
community and wider public at large, and recommended that a range of interventions were 
necessary in order to restore trust. Of course, the participants themselves knew full well that 
issues of trust and legitimacy were at stake in such a public inquiry process – as demonstrated 
by The Association of Chartered Certified Accountants’ (ACCA) extensive letter to the Auditing 
Practice Board5. While it is clear that the Inquiry process itself represented an attempt to 
transfer trust from the political system to the audit industry, through the highly ritualised and 
ceremonial display of ‘accountability’ (Power, 1997; Shore & Wright, 2000: 83-84; also Miller 
& Rose, 2008: 212), trust had not been fully restored through this process alone. Indeed, the 
continued presence of dis-trust is evidenced in the repeated calls for greater regulation, 
improvements in auditing standards and, above all, the referral of the audit industry to the 
Competition Commission for investigation6. The Competition Commission delivered a 
provisional report in the summer of 20137; the report is noteworthy as it is critical of the audit 
market as currently configured. The Commission made a number of recommendations that 
can be read as trying to repair trust in the expert system of audit: (i) FTSE350 firms should put 
their audit out to tender at least every five years; (ii) Financial Reporting Council should audit 
each audit engagement at least every five years; (iii) Prohibition of Big Four clauses in loan 
                                                          
5 http://www.frc.org.uk/Our-Work/Publications/APB/Consultation-on-audit-firms-providing-non-audit-
se/Responses-to-Consultation-on-audit-firms-providing/ACCA.aspx 
6 “Big Four Audit Tenders benefit from ‘virtuous circle’”, Accountancy Age, 01/10/2012.  
http://www.accountancyage.com/aa/news/2213523/big-four-audit-tenders-benefit-from-virtuous-circle.  
7 http://www.competition-commission.org.uk/media-centre/latest-news/2013/jul/cc-outlines-
measures-for-audit-market 
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agreements that compels a company to use one of the Big Four; (iv) strengthening the power 
of the audit committee in firms.  
   These recommendations evince a certain level of distrust in the audit market. The 
measures suggested are very much directed at repairing trust in the current audit market; 
they stop short of a more fundamental shake-up or break-up, such as a move to replace the 
Big Four with a state-run institution. However, a break-up may also be initiated by the 
European Commission under competition rules8. In 2012, the European Commission released 
a briefing document suggesting that audit firms should be restricted to the provision of ‘audit 
only’ in the EU, that audit firms should not sell other services to clients, and that there should 
be mandatory rotation of auditors every six years.  The European proposals extend far beyond 
those of the UK Competition Commission. One conclusion is that commercial interests were 
not viewed as fundamentally incompatible with trust in the audit expert system. It was not 
seen as a case of whether commercial firms can be trusted to be objective, fair and prudent 
in auditing, but rather what forms of oversight and regulation are necessary to ensure that 
they maintain these standards and do not exploit their oligopolistic privileges.   
 
Discussion 
In this paper we argue that inquiries, commissions and committees “render the 
actions and judgments of professionals governable in new ways” (Miller and Rose, 2008: 109), 
and are a means of governing organizations and enforcing accountability. It is a feature and is 
forming a part within a broader picture of distributed public governance in the U.K. (Flinders, 
2004). A failure to maintain trust in the expert system of audit could lead to new forms of 
state intervention in the field (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012: 76), such as a prohibition of certain 
activities (such as consulting services), an enforced break-up of the oligopoly, or enforced joint 
audit, following the example of countries like France.  We argue that whether such outcomes 
are seriously considered or not arises from the performative effects of the interrogative rituals 
of the inquiry. For example, the Lords constantly questioned the premise of the Big Four’s 
standard operating practices, frequently expressing their incredulity at some of the 
established practices. At a minimum, an inquiry might simply amount to an institutionalised 
ritualised display of holding-someone-to-account that signals to society that something is 
being done even if, actually, actions are modest and fairly ineffectual (Meyer & Rowan, 1983; 
                                                          
8 “Michel Barnier moves forward to break up Big Four Audit Firms”, Daily Telegraph, 29 November 2011. 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/supportservices/8924093/Michel-Barnier-moves-forward-to-
break-up-Big-Four-audit-firms.html 
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Brown, 2005). By taking this argument a step further, some have argued that public inquiries 
are therefore little more than a ‘smokescreen’, a veneer of accountability enabling the 
established power relations and lines of influence between business and politics to remain 
unchanged (Engelen, et al., 2012; Froud et al., 2012). Our own analysis is differs from this view 
in that we propose to connect Miller and Rose’s theory of governmentality with Sztompka’s 
(1999: 46-51) theory of transfer of (dis)trust: we argue that ‘agencies of accountability’ which 
exemplify institutionalized trust (ibid. p.46), such as the Lord’s Economic Affairs Select 
Committee in our case, could help replenish the diminished trust experienced by the Big Four.  
Following Gillespie et al’s (2012: 191) typology, comprising (a) apology, (b) denial, (c) 
excuse/justification and (d) reticence, the trust repair tactics of the Big Four can be classified 
as a combination of ‘denial’ and ‘excuse/justification’. Gillespie et al. (2012: 191) claim that 
denials are typically effective where the violator is innocent, but that denials are ineffective 
where the violator is guilty of the trust violation. Our study takes the perspective that we can 
only view these matters through a veil of ignorance, which means that we can only study the 
role of denials and excuses/justifications in the interactional process through which ‘guilt’ or 
‘innocence’ is discursively established in the course of an investigation. In our study,  the 
deployment of denial and excuses/justifications seemed largely ineffective at shaping the 
official version of what  is wrong with the audit industry and whether they are to be trusted 
to continue ‘business as usual’. We propose that it is not the use of denial or 
justification/excuses per se, but rather how plausible and convincing they discursively appear 
to powerful institutional actors, such as political representatives, members of a public inquiry 
or regulators, that shape whether or not a violator is deemed guilty of a breach of trust. A key 
insight from our paper is that it is important for trust research to focus on the role of accounts 
in field-configuring events such as public inquiries (McInerney, 2008; Kramer, 2012; Gillespie 
et al., 2012) in ways that bridge the study of situated accounts at the micro level, and systems 
of institutional reform at the meso and macro level. In our case, the Big Four’s attempts to 
repair trust were largely unsuccessful; consequently, a package of measures aimed at reform 
has been recommended in order to restore trust in the expert system of audit.  
In addition, an important nuance also emerges from our study: we suggest that 
explicit recognition of violation or transgression, coupled with direct apologies and 
expressions of regret, guilt or blame, do not serve to restore trust in expert systems, but 
instead further undermine trust.  For instance, admission of a failure in duty and lack of 
objectivity due to commercial interests would not only have opened the Big Four to potential 
litigation or criminal prosecution, but would have also intensified the dis-trust of the expert 
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system of audit. In the case of expert systems, therefore, we argue that trust ‘violators’ have 
to strike a balance between showing humility and/or regret, accompanied perhaps by pledges 
of future trustworthiness, without directly admitting fault, liability and blame. If auditors 
admitted failings in uncovering fraud or risk (competence) or failings in reporting them to 
investors or regulators for fear of damaging their client relationship (integrity), the entire audit 
expert system would have been at risk of a more severe breakdown in trust. In our case, 
strategies of appeal to higher professional values, legal compliance and cosmological forces 
(such as market forces, globalisation, and adaptation) played an important role in providing 
that balance. 
This point connects to one of the findings from our study, namely the predominance 
of repair strategies (namely cosmology, higher values, institutionalised conventions and 
jurisdiction), which do not accept that a violation or transgression of trust has taken place. 
Other, perhaps less frequent, repair strategies - concessions and pledges - are distinct in that 
they recognise a transgression of some kind, such that it warrants some kind of 
acknowledgement of the breach in trust, admission of responsibility, and attempt to 
compensate, reassure or otherwise heal the relationship. This suggests that our study stands 
in contrast to other studies which show the importance of acknowledgements of 
transgression, admissions of responsibility, offer of penance, repentance or repair, requests 
for forgiveness and expression of remorse and contrition in trust repair (for example, Lewicki 
& Polin, 2012).  Apologies and admissions of responsibility were notably absent from the Big 
Four in our study.  
Our study has shown that it was only after a ritualistic display of ‘scrutiny’ and 
‘accountability’ through the thorough interrogation of accounts that trust repair through 
structural reform became possible. We propose that structural reform is crucially dependent 
on the production, interrogation and interpretation of (often competing) accounts to establish 
an ‘official’ and ‘authoritative’ version of what (if anything) is wrong and what (if anything) 
can be done to restore trust. Our study has shown that the testimonial accounts produced by 
the Big Four were largely discredited, disregarded or dismissed in the official report produced 
by the Committee (and the governmental response thereafter), who instead concluded that 
the audit market in its current form could not be trusted and structural reform was to be 
recommended. One might argue that by showing a critical approach with a willingness to 
challenge powerful industry incumbents, the report authors enhance their own credibility 
and, thus, the authority of the final report. 
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Conclusion 
Audit has expanded into ever more regions of public and private life and pervaded our very 
way of thinking and reasoning about ourselves and those with whom we interact (Power, 
1997; Strathern, 2000). Audit is premised on a systematic distrust of companies, viewed as 
having a potential interest in manipulating their financial records; being able to trust 
companies is the hoped-for outcome of the audit system. Checking and certifying these 
financial records is one of the very ‘trust-regulation mechanisms’ that are designed to 
(re)assure trust in the financial system; for this assurance to operate effectively, the expertise 
and independence of auditors must itself be trusted. In short, an effective audit should 
produce trust and comfort for stakeholders relying on the verisimilitude of the company 
records.  Auditors can, however, only be trusted if they are believed to have (a) a certain body 
of expert knowledge that ensures their competence, (b) a commitment to higher professional 
values that ensure they themselves are not solely driven by self-interest, and (c) to be 
themselves “certified by a trusted agency.” (Zucker, 1986: 606) That the audit industry is the 
subject of a political inquiry - in effect being ‘audited’ - is a manifestation of the widespread 
breakdown of this belief in the aftermath of the financial crisis (Gillespie et. al., 2012; Engelen, 
et al 2012; Davies, 2010). Our study has shown that the question of trust in both the 
competence and integrity of the audit industry in the UK has been played out in the course of 
a parliamentary inquiry led by the House of Lords Select Committee on Economic Affairs. 
Extant trust research primarily focuses on two distinct levels: the micro-level of trust 
within dyadic inter-personal relationships, cognitive processes and verbal accounts, and the 
macro-level of system-level and institutional trust (Gillespie et. al., 2012). Building on this 
work, we show how trust ‘travels’ (Currall & Inkpen, 2006: 236), across and between levels.  
Our study demonstrates that it was only through the situated accounts produced by a range 
of institutional actors at the hearings that the structural reforms recommended by the Inquiry 
could plausibly be put forward. Only by establishing what went wrong, and who or what was 
responsible, was the committee able to produce legitimate recommendations on structural 
reform. Building on Janoff-Bulman & Parker’s (2012) argument, we argue that trust can only 
be transferred from the political system to the audit expert system if political representatives 
are seen to be non-partisan, thus free of allegiance to commercial interests or specific 
outcomes. Our study therefore shows how the two dimensions – the micro-level of situated 
accounts, and the meso- and macro-level of legal, political and regulatory systems – are linked. 
More specifically, we illustrate how the re-establishment of trust operated through 
three stages: (a) public displays of trust problematisation (see Tables 2 and 3), (b) the 
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production of an official report providing an ‘authoritative’ and ‘objective’ view of the 
trustworthiness of the industry and profession, promulgating an official evaluation of the trust 
repair strategies employed by the ‘violators’ (see Tables 4 and 5), and (c) the translation of 
this document into legislative and regulatory changes.9 Before trust restoration mechanisms 
can be put in place, inquiries have to ensure that, (a) a violation of trust has actually occurred, 
(b) the violators are identified, and (c) the violators are interrogated with adequate scepticism 
to establish what went wrong. The four strategies we have identified, which sought to 
problematize both the integrity and competence of the Big Four through interrogation of the 
industry’s competition, conflicts of interest, practices of information exchange and 
representation, and auditing standards (see Tables 2 and 3), contribute towards theorising 
how trust problematisation takes place in the setting of a public inquiry. As we discussed 
earlier in this paper, the limitation of our approach is that our paper needs to be assessed in 
way of its plausibility and theoretical validity, rather than with regard to the concept of 
external validity (or generalizability), as it is far from straightforward to demonstrate how this 
inquiry, or this hearing within the inquiry, are typical or representative of developments more 
broadly.  
In addition, our findings help us understand some of the distinctive features of the 
maintenance of trust in professions, such as audit. In other industries, anti-competitive 
behaviour and selling on additional services may be similarly illegitimate according to socially 
defined norms of ‘fair play’ and ‘objectivity’ but, crucially, would not result in a fundamental 
breakdown of trust in the organizations themselves. Undertaken by a retail firm, say, such 
behaviour would not be socially sanctioned, but would also not unilaterally undermine 
consumer confidence in the firm’s products or services. Nor would it be likely to spark a 
parliamentary inquiry. Should trust in the competence of auditors to produce an accurate and 
prudent assessment of the financial health of a company be undermined, on the other hand, 
investment decisions and markets run the risk of de-stabilisation. Indeed, to be seen as merely 
‘rubber stamping’ - having their judgement coloured by their self-interested need to maintain 
the client relationship (Turley, 2008: 213) or avoid litigation – might well fundamentally 
undermine trust in the judgement of the auditors.  
Finally, our study suggests that trust research can be advanced by studying the 
processes through which specific behaviours, actions or events become associated with trust 
(Elsbach, 2004; Roberts, 2001; Powell, 1996), thus contributing to “a better understanding of 
                                                          
9 We have drawn up tables summarising these developments. These have not been included due to space 
constraints but we are happy to make them available upon request. 
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the antecedents and consequences of trust in contemporary organizational contexts” (Kramer 
& Cook, 2004: 2-3). In many cases, behaviours are unambiguously associated with a breach of 
trust, such as fraud in the case of financial relationships. Yet, as studies of trust across 
generations (Davis et. al., 2012) and across nations (Bohnet, et. al., 2012) have shown, there 
exists considerable diversity in different individual and collective perceptions of what is 
deemed ‘untrustworthy behaviour’ and what would count as betrayal (Robinson et al., 2004). 
The decision to create a cross-partisan political inquiry into auditors in the UK, but not in other 
European countries or indeed in the U.S., also highlights this point. We will discuss the issue 
of national differences in more detail in the next section. 
Our study also contributes another dimension, namely the way in which external 
events play an important role in transforming previously accepted behaviour. In the case of 
the audit industry, the range of behaviours problematized by the Inquiry – including low 
switching rates, oligopolistic domination by four major players, infrequent meetings with 
shareholders and regulators, and use of IFRS standards – has long been in place without being 
seen as an indication that auditors were less than trustworthy. Indeed, Chandler & Edwards 
(1996) have shown that auditor independence, competition between auditors, and audit 
regulation were discussed as early as 1896 as potentially problematic issues. The financial 
crisis clearly acted as a decisive event which shifted perception amongst key institutional 
actors including the government and the regulators, framing the current state of affairs as 
inadequate. Our study therefore has strong resonance with the wider critique of professions 
as ‘cartels’ who use idealized versions of themselves as masters of a unique codified body of 
knowledge, who adhere to higher professional values or ideals (truth, justice, public good) as 
a façade to hide the monopolistic protection of commercial interests (Reed, 1996; Freidson, 
2001). Our study contributes to how such problematisations are accomplished in situ, by 
whom, and to what effect in relation to the potential repair of trust. Our conclusion is 
therefore not that auditors have breached trust in their integrity and competence through 
protectionist, self-interested behaviour, but rather that what matters most is whether in the 
opinion of authoritative institutions (such as parliamentary bodies) they have  broken the trust 
that society vests in them. 
 
Wider Theoretical Implications 
What are the wider implications of our analysis for theory development in terms of 
studies of expert systems, trust, and accountability? The point of departure for this paper is 
that while “the auditing profession has a vested interest in convincing users that accountants 
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can be trusted” (Holm & Zaman, 2012: 59), the Inquiry is evidence that this trust has been 
problematized. Thus, “the institutional environment which determines the quality of 
interactions between firms” (Bachmann, 2001/6: 452) has become problematic in its ability 
“to generate shared economic, technical, cultural and social knowledge and to produce 
collectively accepted norms of business behaviour.” (ibid) What had been the basis of 
normality for the institution of Audit to function has now become the basis for asking: can we 
still afford our normal trusting attitude vis-à-vis audit? Major crises and scandals are 
interesting precisely because they typically lead to a shift in sensemaking about what is (or 
should) be accepted practice in a particular industry (Maitlis & Sonenshein, 2010). Our study 
contributes to the body of work that seeks to understand the role of trust problematisation 
and repair during major crises, failures and scandals by enabling us to learn lessons from such 
“negative deviants” (Kramer, 2012: 70), i.e. a major “public trust crisis” (Eilifsen & Willekens, 
2008: 1). The challenge for future research into policy-making is to learn how to ensure 
effective vigilance and scrutiny of expert systems before such major crises or scandals occur.  
A number of literatures shed light on our understanding of national differences  
regarding the institutionalisation (or lack thereof) of trust relationships: Doney et al. (1998: 
601) provide a more general conceptualization regarding “the ways national culture impacts 
the trust-building process.” From a socio-economics perspective, Harriss (2008), found a high 
degree of ‘selective trust’ in India, referring to trust “amongst groups of people within specific 
social networks” (ibid. p.320), arising when institutionalised sanctions and incentives are weak 
and law enforcement is poor. Child and Möllering (2003: 69) showed that in China “economic 
relations are strongly dependent on trust ...”. Trust in the German business environment is 
also judged to be high, but for very different reasons: industrial banking, with long-term loan 
arrangements between banks and companies are the institutional basis for “lasting and 
nurturing relationships of trust …” (Misztal, 1996: 215). The Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) 
literature has drawn comparisons between different national business environments and 
made the contrast between Coordinated Market Economies (CMEs), such as Germany, with 
Liberal Market Economies (LMEs), such as the UK and USA, (eg Hall & Soskice, 2001; Hall & 
Gingerich, 2009), but so far little is known about arrangements of auditor regulation and 
corporate governance (save for Vitols et al., 2001). Some have argued that supervisory board 
representation enjoyed by banks and insurance companies provides them with some insights 
into the internal financial affairs of the company in question and therefore makes them less 
dependent on the information provided by auditors (Köhler et al., 2008: 136). This structural 
position means that the German National Business System, for instance, is overall far less 
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dependent on the checking functions of auditors which could be seen as a market solution 
appropriate in the ‘shareholder model of capitalism’ – perhaps, not surprisingly, there has 
been no equivalent parliamentary inquiry into auditor effectiveness in stakeholder capitalist 
Germany.  
One question worth exploring in future research therefore is whether CMEs are less 
dependent on external auditors than LMEs. Based on our analysis, we suggest that “legal 
norms and trust are more than compatible. In fact, legal regulation can foster the constitution 
of trust” (Bachmann, 2001/6: 451). According to Sitkin and Roth (1993/2006: 298), existing 
literature “suggests that attempts to ‘remedy’ trust violations legalistically frequently fail 
because they paradoxically reduce the level of trust rather than reproducing trust.” Following 
Bachmann and Inkpen (2011), “(e)xtensive empirical research is needed to show whether our 
conceptual framework helps to fully understand why and how institutions matter, where 
institutional-trust can stand in for interaction-based trust and vice versa.” We have addressed 
Bachmann and Inkpen’s (2011) call for research by showing how, during phases of 
problematisation and restoration, institution-based trust is dependent on the ritualised 
interrogation of accounts and production of official accounts. 
To our mind, audit’s ‘epistemic obscurity’ – to borrow a phrase from Power (1999) -  
is due to audit requiring both system and personal trust. This is reflected in the interactional 
dynamics at the testimony: when the partners are pushed to 'account for' why they have not 
reached a different assessment in their previous audits (for example, with regard to banks 
that subsequently failed and required state bail-outs), their answers make clear that for audit 
to function, both system and personal trust needs to apply. Audit opinions are largely rule-
bound, but within a ‘grey zone’ they are also judgments that involve discretion and therefore 
cannot be fully accounted for with reference to a rule system. This is what Power (1997: 28) 
refers to as audit’s 'weak knowledge base': "there is no way of specifying the assurance 
production function independently of a practitioner's own qualitative opinion process". In this 
sense, audit is, like banking, a trust-intensive industry (Swedberg, 2010: 71). This is indeed a 
central point: audit is a judgment, which in itself can only partially be accounted for and, 
therefore, the way it was reached procedurally needs to be trusted. As Power (1997) argued 
"the epistemic foundation of financial auditing, i.e. the relation between its inputs and the 
production of assurance, is essentially obscure. Ultimately, financial auditing requires that the 
judgements of auditing experts are trusted." (ibid. 15) We therefore conclude that auditors 
are an expression both of our trust and our distrust. Hence, rival accounts to the Big Four’s 
account of ‘sound audit judgement’ are always potentially possible: lack of competition, 
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conflicts of interest, absence of shareholder dialogue, lack of regulatory oversights, and so on 
– as evidenced by our analysis.  
We therefore argue that systemic or institutional trust is ultimately rooted in rituals 
of accountability at critical field-configuring events. The questioners in the inquiry we have 
analysed opened up for debate some of the institutionalised trusting actions vis-a-vis audit. 
Thus, trust in audit can be repaired only insofar as we still trust the political system of inquiries 
and their recommendations. For trust transfer to take place as a result of such inquiries, “it is 
necessary to craft institutional arrangements, which sustain and re-build trust as social 
capital.” (Misztal, 1996: 214) One could argue that increasingly we live not (primarily) in the 
‘Audit Society’ but in the ‘Inquiry Society’ – inquiries are indeed everywhere: the UK has 
recently seen Inquiries into phone hacking by the Press, editorial lapses at the BBC, 
parliamentarians’ expenses, the LIBOR rate scandal, and so on. For us, inquiries are a 
mechanism of transferring trust from one area of society where some amount of trust still 
exists (e.g. the legal framework or political oversight system) to where much less trust exists: 
many areas ranging from the banks, the Big Four, the newspapers, the BBC, politicians, 
parliament and so on. Trust transfer is thus potentially a crucial mechanism for the repair of 
damaged legitimacy.  
 
The Future of the Audit Industry 
It has long been held that legalized norms of procedural fairness, which underlie this like other 
inquiries, “are the sine qua non for society-wide ‘generalized trust’” (Cohen & Arato, 1992: 
27). Our ability to hold powerful privileged operators to account is the condition for our 
generalised ability to, under normalized conditions, be trusting and let them function (or get 
on with it). While this holding-to-account may soon be forgotten and a return to ‘business as 
usual’ might follow, there is also the prospect of the scrutiny becoming much more intense 
and semi-permanent. This could play out in a number of ways: first, we may see more of the 
strategies used by the Big Four in this paper to repair trust with little or no substantive change 
to the institutional field; second, it might lead to legislation that changes the existing political-
economic settlement that has been so favourable to the Big Four firms; third, it may open up 
a fissure between the UK and European Union institutions over the treatment of audit firms 
(Quick et al., 2008). There is of course nothing inevitable about any of these courses of actions, 
but the House of Lords inquiry certainly marks the start of a political-economic reformulation 
of the role and status of the Big Four. The Big Four audit firms will be far from passive in this 
process and will undoubtedly provide fascinating glimpses into their political power. Existing 
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work by Anderson-Gough et al. (2000) and others (author reference, 2013) reveals the 
embedded nature of social relations that exist within an audit contract. In the world of familiar 
relations between audit partners and their clients, characterized by high levels of personal as 
well as system trust, a critical report from the House of Lords is likely to have little or no impact 
on this relationship. Outside of the UK, any impact between firms and their clients would be 
negligible.  
It is the impact on the policy world where the House of Lords report is likely to have 
its greatest impact. This is a world far removed from the personal relationships between audit 
firms and their clients, it is one that seeks to evaluate whether the current expert system of 
audit is indeed what that can be trusted.  There are a number of reasons why the House of 
Lords report stands the possibility of being influential in the long-term: (a) The subject matter 
was highly topical and resonated with concerns being expressed in Western Europe and in 
North America; (b) Members of the committee are highly regarded within the world financial 
infrastructure and, consequently, they have an ‘authority to speak’; and (c) It is a report 
written from within the Parliament housed in one of the three leading world cities (Sassen, 
2013) and one of the world’s leading financial centres. Perhaps the greatest reason that a 
critique by the House of Lords on the expert system of audit in the UK is likely to be far-
reaching is because accounting is highly standardized as a profession internationally. In fact, 
accounting could be considered to be the quintessential global profession. Standardization 
has occurred through the widespread diffusion of International Financial Reporting Standards, 
in addition to the global dominance of the Big Four accounting firms. The corollary of this is 
that a critique of one context (the UK audit system) is likely to apply to other contexts because 
of the high levels of standardization and market concentration.  
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